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Burkina Faso
• Population: 15.8 million
• GDP per capita (PPP): $1200 (207/228)
• Occupation: 90% engaged in agriculture
• Literacy: 30% (men), 15%(females)
• Spending on health per person: $7
• Life expectancy : 53 years (199/228)
• Infant mortality rate: 85 /1000 live births
• No. of people per doctor: 33,333
Reference: https://www.cia.gov  
Community-based 
health insurance
Premium
Access to 
health care
Capitation
• Introduced in 2004
• 41 villages and Nouna town 
(i.e. 7762 households)
• Unit of enrolment: household
• Premium: 1500 CFA (2.29€) per adult     
500 CFA (0.76€) per child p.a.
Community-based Health Insurance
(CBI)
BUT,  enrollment among the 
poor was low. Therefore, in 
2007, premium subsidy was 
offered to the poor
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Sharp 
increase in 
enrolment 
after premium 
subsidy was 
offered
Question 1. 
Do the sick enrol more? 
(adverse selection)
Variables Coefficient SE
Age (years)
≤ 15 0.004 0.009
60+ 0.015 0.036
Education
Literate -0.001 0.006
Subsidized
Subsidy 0.1 0.011***
Household size
Size -0.002 0.001***
SES
MidSES 0.015 0.006***
HighSES 0.028 0.007***
Year
2005 0.003 0.003
2006 -0.002 0.003
2007 0.009 0.004**
Sick X Year
Sick x 2004 0.001 0.010
Sick x 2005 0.000 0.009
Sick x 2006 0.008 0.009
Sick x 2007 0.021 0.011**
No. of observations
No. of individuals
F statistic (p-value)
R
2
11.47 (0.000)
0.0078
18480
6713
Proportion of sick 
individuals  
enrolled 
significantly 
increased in 2007
1. Fixed Effects Regression
Dependent variable: CBHI (0,1)
Sick: individuals who reported 
being sick for at least 3 months
Interaction: Sick*Year
***1%, **5% and *10%  sig levels
Questions 2. 
Why should adverse selection 
increase in 2007?
- Did subsidy increase adverse selection?
Variables Coefficient SE
Age (years)
≤ 15 0.005 0.009
60+ 0.018 0.036
Education
Literate -0.002 0.006
Subsidized
Subsidy 0.1 0.012***
Household size
Size -0.002 0.001***
SES
MidSES 0.015 0.006***
HighSES 0.028 0.007***
Year
2005 0.002 0.003
2006 -0.001 0.003
2007 0.013 0.004***
Sick X Subsidy
Sick x Subsidy=0 0.008 0.007
Sick x Subsidy=1 0.048 0.027*
No. of observations
No. of individuals
F statistic (p-value)
R
2
11.47 (0.000)
0.0078
18480
6713
Proportion of sick 
individuals more 
among those who 
were given subsidy
2. Fixed Effects Regression
Dependent variable: CBHI (0,1)
Sick: individuals who reported 
being sick for at least 3 months
Interaction: Sick*Subsidy
***1%, **5% and *10%  sig levels
Community wealth ranking: defining poverty
Poverty criteria:
as decided by the community
Poverty categories
Very poor Middle Rich
Old person without child +++
Needs to beg to live +++
No chickens +++
No assistance network +++
Unable to finance medical costs +++ ++
In good health ++ +++
High quality housing ++ +++
Sufficient food ++ +++
Nice clothes ++ +++
Ownership of farming equipment ++ +++
Able to support someone ++ +++
Ownership of transport means ++ +++
• Enrolment significantly increased among the poor when 
subsidized premiums were offered to them
• More poor households were likely to be sick than the rich ones
• By offering the poor subsidized premiums – proportion of sick 
individuals increased in CBHI 
Conclusions
Cost of providing health insurance increases
• Strictly enforce enrolment of complete households
• Remove subsidy– but this will discourage the poor from 
enrolling who have greater need for health insurance – harms 
equity! 
Adverse Selection OR Positive selection (well-targetted)
• Increase premiums for rich: rich subsidize the poor  but will 
discourage enrolment among them (context: rich=less poor)
• Essential to receive government/international support to cover 
these extra costs
Need to budget for adverse selection
Implications for CBHI
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